Review

Reviewed Work(s): The Disunity of Science: Boundaries, Contexts, and Power. by Peter Galison and David J. Stump

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between 1917 and 1989/1991. Benner doubts "whether the founders of 'Marxism' would have endorsed the centralist and authoritarian brands of internationalism which were discredited by their association with communist regimes." ("In politics Marx was a ferocious anti-authoritarian; and 'really existing' communism was, in its gentlest incarnations, an authoritarian system of government.") Since Marx-the-communist interests her little, Benner does not speculate on whether the project to abolish private property and to build a classless society, undertaken in 1917, would have nonetheless found Marx's approval. As for the phenomenon of postcommunist nationalism, "nothing in his writings suggests it would have surprised him," and Benner believes that her reconstruction of Marx's thought on nationalism can help to produce a better understanding of nationalism after the fall of Communism.

The Disunity of Science: Boundaries, Contexts, and Power. Edited by Peter Galison and David J. Stump. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1996. Pp. 567. $65.00 (cloth); $24.95 (paper).

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Historically, the rhetoric of unity is a stock feature of the "journey to the east" in search of "truth," "wisdom," God, and moral order. The term "Unity" is the first word and the first sentence in Peter Galison's introduction to this important contribution to science studies. The first names we come across in the text are Otto Neurath, Rudolf Carnap, and Charles Morris, the editors of the *Encyclopedia of Unified Science.* A few pages later, we are reminded of Patrick Suppes's 1978 article on "The Plurality of Science" (*PSAyear* 2:3–16). Galison draws our attention to the disunity/unity axis and what its "wandering valence" can tell us about science as a historical realization and about the history of culture. The editors would like readers to reach or at least consider the conclusion underscored in David Stump's afterword: that science studies is moving away from the realism/relativism debate and becoming focused on the complex details of local scientific practice.

Stump's afterword makes explicit the fact that this volume represents a philosophical project and philosopher's interests. The aim of this collection has been, we learn in Stump's very last paragraph, to initiate "a real integration of philosophy into science studies." The contributors include 11 philosophers (J. Rouse, N. Cartwright, A. Fine, D. Stump, A. Wylie, J. Cat, H. Change, R. Creath, A. Davidson, J. Dupre, and I. Hacking), five historians or philosopher/historians (M. Biagioli, P. Galison, E. F. Keller, T. Lenoir, and S. Schaffer), one sociologist (K. Knorr-Cetina), one philosopher/sociologist (S. Fuller), and two representatives from cultural studies (D. Haraway and C. L. Ross). The book is organized in three main sections: boundaries, contexts, and power. The editors and contrib-

utors have worked hard and successfully to cross-fertilize each other's chapters. This tends to give the volume a certain unity. But, as we might expect given the theme of this volume, there are also signs of disunity: Schaffer argues for a contextualized history of canonical texts, Biagioli opposes this with a prescription for locating the author of historical texts; Rouse argues for a Foucauldian critique of the "sovereign" conception of power, which he finds represented in the works of Galison, Lenoir, and Ross, and other science studies scholars; Fuller is critical of Latour's conception of interpretation as translation. There is an underlying, but certainly not unified, opposition to social constructionism as a reductive strategy.

There are two basic foils for the arguments put forth in this book—one, looking backward, is the Unity of Science movement; the other, looking to the present, is science studies as it has come to be dominated by social constructionists and actor-network theorists. Most of the contributors assume that there is something local about science, but Galison's description of this assumption as an "intuition" is revealing. As a sociologist/anthropologist of science, I am more inclined to ground this assumption in the outcomes of studies such as Knorr-Cetina's study of scientific practice. This trivial-sounding semantic issue reveals, however, the major disunity in this volume, and that is the abyss between sociology/anthropology and philosophy. The unifying agenda of the editors and at least some of the contributors would dismiss the realism/relativism/rationality debates in science studies and concentrate on exploring the philosophical implications of contextualizing science, the temporality of science, and social explanations of scientific practice. I have no quarrel with this agenda in the wider arena of science studies. However, I find criticisms of social constructionism as "reductionist," attempts to save epistemology from becoming the province of social science, and the defense of the illusory notion that "the subject" and "human agency" are not thoroughly sociocultural phenomena illustrative of a widespread failure among historians and philosophers of science (not to mention some sociologists of science) to comprehend the meaning of "social construction of science." The biggest error here is to treat "social constructionism" as a philosophical idea subject to the traditional linguistic and logical tools of philosophical argument. This is part of a larger failure (not limited to philosophers) to comprehend the nature and achievements of sociology as a theoretical and empirical enterprise. I cannot pursue this disunifying theme here, but I cannot be as optimistic as David Stump about ending intellectual turf conflicts nor as certain that this would promote better understanding of science and scientific knowledge as social and cultural phenomena.

Specific criticisms and praises aside, this book opens an important window on the contemporary science studies landscape and should be read by anyone interested in the issues that continue to drive this multidisciplinary field as well as by science and culture wars watchers and participants.